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From Life to Existence  
A Reconsideration of the Question of 
Intentionality in Michel Henry’s Ethics  
Frédéric Seyler  
DePaul University 
Through his radical phenomenology, Michel Henry renews our 
understanding of life as immanent affectivity. Life cannot be reduced to 
what can be made visible, since it is – as immanence and as affectivity – 
radically invisible. Furthermore, individual life is always grounded in 
absolute Life, a thesis that is developed strongly by Henry in his late works 
on Christianity (1996-2002).1 
While concerning at first both phenomenology and the philosophy of 
religion, Henry’s approach is also crucial from an ethical and political point 
of view, as is shown by his critique of “barbarism” in contemporary culture 
(1987).2 “Barbarism” appears precisely as a consequence of the attempt to 
negate immanent subjectivity and to reduce it to the sphere of visibility, to 
objectify and to quantify it, as happens in the ideology of scientism and its 
technological organization of society. 
If life is radically immanent, however, the living (le vivant) must relate 
to the world, to possible projects and decisions, in short: it must exist. But, 
since existence requires and includes intentional components, human reality 
– both living and existing – implies that immanence and intentionality are 
related to one another, even though they are simultaneously conceived as 
radically distinct modes of appearing in Henry’s phenomenology of life. For 
the latter “existence” clearly refers to a life in the world. It therefore implies 
the fundamental relationship of immanence and transcendence, affectivity 
and intentionality.  
Following this line of thought, we are faced with at least two questions: 
First, what reality does immanent appearing possess for us as existing and 
intentional beings? And second, from an ethical point of view, what does the 
opposition between “barbarism” and a life in God mean in terms of 
existence?  
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With regard to the first question, it is not sufficient to oppose 
intentionality and affectivity. Criticizing radical phenomenology on the 
ground that it is non-intentional does not explain the stance that is taken in 
favor of intentionality as a paradigm for the phenomenological method; 
from Henry’s point of view, this stance simply begs the question.3 It is 
therefore essential to analyze the relationship of intentionality and 
affectivity within the framework of radical phenomenology, thereby testing 
the resources of this phenomenology and, perhaps, its need for further 
extension towards intentionality. This is especially the case – and this refers 
to the second question – in the context of ethics, when we ask what kind of 
life we should live, the question of a possible translation or expression of 
affective life into intentional existence appears as a core problem.4 
Indeed, ethics is the domain where the relationship between affectivity 
and intentionality is brought to the level of a decisive problem involving the 
fundamental principles of the phenomenology of life. If, according to Henry, 
what is at stake in ethics is the rediscovery of life in its affective and absolute 
dimension, how does this rediscovery manifest itself in the concrete 
development of one’s own existence? How are we to configure existence in 
accordance with life’s affective self-revelation? However, as important as it 
may be to recognize the transcendental genesis of any field of social existence, 
the appeal to the recognition of a community of the living in absolute life, 
paired with a critique of those forms of social organization which do not 
allow for such a recognition, does not yet seem to be a sufficient guide for 
social change, for instance.5  
In what follows, I argue from the perspective of two key elements of the 
ethics of affectivity6 – the critique of “barbarism” and the call for a “second 
birth” - that Henry’s approach to the living manifests a certain tension 
between the two main propositions of his phenomenology of life:  on the one 
hand, the difference- or “duality-thesis” according to which life as auto-
affection or affectivity is radically non-intentional, meaning that 
intentionality and affectivity are therefore two radically different modes of 
appearing,7 and on the other hand, the “foundation-thesis” which states that 
both intentionality and the world are ultimately grounded in affectivity.8 As 
a result, it appears and follows from the standpoint of radical 
phenomenology itself that immanent affectivity has reality for us only 
insofar as it finds its expression or translation in the realm of the 
intentionally visible and that, with regard to the second question, both 
“barbarism” and its overcoming in “second birth” are effective only insofar 
as they are translated or expressed through representations. Henry’s critique 
of representation and intentionality (essentially, through the duality-thesis) 
needs to be revised therefore (in accordance with the foundation-thesis), 
especially in the field of practical philosophy, where the essential role 
played by intentionality has to be acknowledged by radical phenomenology. 
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Furthermore, as pointed out in the conclusion, there are strong reasons 
to doubt that the importance of intentionality can be limited to its being a 
translation or expression of absolute life. Thus, hearing the word of life 
(parole de la Vie) would still entail the recognition of absolute life; again, 
however, this recognition alone would not, in itself, entail a ready answer to 
the question “what should I do?” 
The Ethics of Affectivity: The Primacy of Immanent and 
Absolute Life 
Henry’s radical phenomenology or phenomenology of life has resolutely 
adopted the risky standpoint of an infra- or non-intentional phenomenology. 
This may be seen as early as 1963 in Henry’s first work, The Essence of 
Manifestation9 when he develops the concept of immanent auto-affection or 
affectivity as the appearing that is the foundation and the condition of 
possibility of all appearing, hence the condition of all that appears as 
objectively given through intentionality on the horizon of the world.  
Radical phenomenology is therefore dualistic. There is not one mode of 
appearing but two: intentionality and affectivity. The innovative power of 
Henry’s approach lies, it seems, in two aspects of his phenomenological 
dualism: first, in the radical separation operated between these two modes 
of appearing – affectivity is entirely different from intentionality; it does not 
reveal something other than itself but is, according to its very essence, a self-
revelation –, second, in the discovery that this power of self-revelation does 
not only pertain to life, but is life.  
What, then, is life? Life is what reveals itself to itself without distance, 
underneath the subject-object divide and remains untouched by the distance 
that separates the subject from its representations, in perception, 
imagination, memory, language, etc. Life is therefore tied to itself without 
any possibility of escaping itself, and this is why it can sometimes seem 
unbearable. 
Furthermore, life is what gives life to perception, imagination, memory, 
and language. In other words, there is no intentionality that is not grounded 
in affectivity. For instance, we would never be able to perceive a glass of 
water, if the act of perceiving were not revealed to us without distance. 
Otherwise, we would forever be separated from it by an infinite regress of 
perceiver-perceived. Perception, like memory and other powers of 
intentional directedness, is always and necessarily affective. Perception thus 
is inseparable from its self-revelation to the living, perceiving self.10  
However, this self-revelation, which is the very formula of selfhood or 
ipseity, is invisible, precisely because it can never as such become an object 
for a view from the outside. Therefore, every attempt to see life, to objectify 
it, must fail. We cannot see life; we can only live it.  
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It is not by chance that this very short presentation of Henry’s 
phenomenology reflects both of the theses mentioned earlier: the thesis that 
states that there is a duality in the modes of appearing and the thesis 
according to which the intentional mode of appearing is grounded in the 
more fundamental appearing of affectivity as life’s self-revelation. These two 
theses are indeed essential to radical phenomenology.  
They are also at the heart of its ethical dimension as can be seen through 
Henry’s critique of contemporary culture and scientism. By reducing life to 
the objectifiable and the quantifiable, the latter is in fact tantamount to a 
negation of life as invisible affectivity. Hence, the denunciation of 
contemporary figures of “barbarism” in the 1987 essay La barbarie, an essay 
that takes up and radicalizes the Husserlian critique of the Galilean 
paradigm already presented in the Krisis work.11 In “barbarism” man 
attempts the impossible: to flee from life by negating the existence of 
affectivity and its primacy over the objectively given. This can be seen, for 
instance, in the contemporary endeavor to reduce emotions to neural 
processes or in the impoverishment of our subjective and aesthetic powers 
through mindless television programs.12 
Ethically, this forgetting of life calls for life’s rediscovery. But, since the 
living is not its own origin, since the living has not put itself into existence, it 
is also, and essentially, the religious call to rediscover absolute life, i.e., God, 
understood as the life that engenders itself and all living beings in a 
continuous process of auto-affection. As Henry has argued in I am the Truth: 
A Philosophy of Christianity as well as in his two last books, Incarnation and 
Words of Christ, man’s salvation is only possible on the ground of a “second 
birth” that amounts to the recognition of the transcendental birth of the self 
in absolute life.13 
However, according to Henry, this recognition is affective. It is not a 
becoming aware or a conscious of; it is therefore also outside the power of 
human volition and cultural mediations. Although these mediations, 
including the phenomenology of life itself, can function as catalysts in the 
process of reversing “barbarism” and the “transcendental illusion of the 
ego” by which we take ourselves as being the source of our own powers, 
“second birth” rests essentially on life’s immanent dynamics. “The Spirit 
blows where it wills,” writes Henry quoting the gospel of John. Here it is 
taken to mean that the ethics of affectivity, along with man’s salvation, 
which is synonymous with the rediscovery of (absolute) life, finally depends 
on absolute life itself.14 Hence it may now be seen very clearly that Henry’s 
ethics, or his ethics of affectivity, is intrinsically religious and calls for a 
religious existence, at least in the etymological sense of “religion” as the 
bond between the living and absolute life.15  
However, it is less clear what such an existence would be or would look 
like. For sure, Henry would consider such a question a misunderstanding 
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since immanent life and its dynamics cannot be brought into the light of the 
visible, and therefore there is no point in asking what kind of existence 
would follow from “second birth” or how we ought to describe that 
existence in the realm of intentionality.  
What can be said, however, about such a religious praxis is that it 
would follow almost immediately from our anchoring in absolute life and 
manifest itself as action, as exemplified in the merciful action of the Good 
Samaritan16 or, more generally, in a cultural praxis that is adequate to 
subjective powers insofar as it lives up to and increases these powers instead 
of diminishing, alienating and impoverishing them. In short, according to 
this model, man’s existence in the world is to be the immediate translation, 
or configuration and acting out of life’s immanent and absolute dynamics. 
Human existence is here the expression of a life in and through God. 
“Barbarism” and Intentionality 
As attractive as this solution may appear, it seems to be problematic on 
several grounds and leads to a more complex assessment of the ethics of 
affectivity. First of all, it is worth noting that affectivity is not only the 
ultimate reality and mode of appearing but also the reality on which 
“barbarism” as the very negation of affectivity is grounded. In other words, 
“barbarism” itself is, according to Henry, affective, which means that it has 
its raison d’être in the immanent dynamics of life: it is for affective reasons 
that the human being attempts to flee from life, and the flight into objectivity 
is the privileged means for this attempt.17  
This is perfectly consistent with Henry’s foundation-thesis, since it 
accounts for the fact that all intentionality is founded in affectivity, but is 
problematic with regard to his philosophy of religion. Indeed, if individual 
life is necessarily embedded in and living through absolute life, then it seems 
that the latter should be held ultimately responsible for the development of 
“barbarism,” that is, for life’s attempt to negate itself. But this is a 
consequence that Henry would clearly not defend.   It would, for instance, 
amount to God being the agent of his own forgetting and negation.18 
It is true that in his first book on a philosophy of Christianity in 1996, 
Henry does stress that the invisible essence of life’s auto-affection enables 
one not only to make use of one’s subjective and bodily powers through the 
“I can,” but also to consider oneself the source of these powers. Life’s 
discretion at least facilitates what Henry calls the “transcendental illusion of 
the ego” and it is through this illusion that one turns to the world and away 
from life.19 But this is done in vain, since what one wishes to appropriate on 
the horizon of the world will forever remain outside of one’s life.  
On the other hand, the “transcendental illusion of the ego” and 
“barbarism” require intentionality as the ability to represent and objectify. 
This clearly follows from Henry’s analysis of “barbarism” as relying on the 
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Galilean paradigm and the technological colonization of everyday praxis. 
But this implies in turn that “barbarism” is a phenomenon that does not 
concern all living beings, but only human life. There can be, for instance, no 
“barbarism” in animal life. However, Henry’s constant reluctance to 
integrate a study of animals in his phenomenology of life – a reluctance 
based, it seems, on the argument that we cannot phenomenologically assess 
a life form which does not appear directly to us -, has led Henry implicitly to 
equate the term “the living” with “human life.” 
These two remarks show that human intentionality – or more generally, 
thought (la pensée) – must play a major part in the explanation of 
“barbarism,” a phenomenon that cannot be attributed to both absolute and 
animal life. Though affectivity may be the raison d’être of Kierkegaardian 
despair and “barbarism,” it is not a sufficient reason for it. Moreover, 
intentionality and thought have to be taken into account for our 
understanding of what the overcoming of “barbarism” in a cultural revival 
would actually mean. A quick review of animal life from the standpoint of 
radical phenomenology might further illustrate this statement. 
For the animal too, life may become unbearable at times, for instance, in 
the experience of pain and privation. If, on all levels, life suffers itself (se-
souffrir-soi-même) and is in Henry’s words pathos, then suffering (souffrance) 
refers to a particular affective phase, in which life tries to escape itself 
without being able to do so. The difference between human and animal is 
not that the latter cannot escape life while the former can. Again, life is 
precisely a continuous process of auto-affection from which there is no 
escape, for either animals or humans. But the difference may be found in the 
fact that the human, who through intentionality is capable of thought and 
representation, will try to flee from life into objectivity, thus creating the 
illusion of “liberation,” while the animal remains forever deprived of this 
means. It is precisely because “barbarism” is grounded on a project 
impossible to realize that it unfolds such a destructive energy towards life, a 
self-negation where life wishes not to be alive anymore and which seems 
profoundly alien to the animal kingdom.  
However, if “barbarism” is foreign to the animal, should we therefore 
conclude that animal life is blessed? Or that the human condition is less 
perfect than the animal’s and that, as a consequence, human salvation would 
amount to a regression into a state much closer to that of pure immanence? 
This is not an available option either, since such a regression is neither 
possible nor ethically viable. Undoubtedly, Henry never argues in favor of 
such a regression, and he considers intentionality to be an important part of 
human life. And that is the very meaning of the foundation-thesis in his 
phenomenology of life.  
But the fact remains that Henry’s works bear the constant mark of 
criticism directed towards thought and representation. Even when, in 
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Incarnation, he investigates the very possibility of the phenomenology of life 
as a philosophy, that is to say as a theoretical discourse, thought always 
comes second after affectivity and it is only through the immanent certainty 
of life that the truth of phenomenology as an image-of-life (image-de-la-vie), 
that is, as its adequate translation, can be established.20 The same applies to 
ethical theory, which, besides being no substitute for action, is unable to act 
directly upon affectivity. Affectivity, and affectivity only, is the key to the 
transformation of life. Thus, the recognition of life in “second birth” is the 
work of immanent life, not that of thought or philosophical enlightenment.21 
We have seen that this consequence is problematic since it places not only 
“second birth” but also “barbarism” in the hands of absolute life. 
It seems that there are only two ways out of this aporia. The first is to 
distinguish two forms of affectivity, one belonging exclusively to absolute 
life and the other to the living. In fact, Henry distinguishes in this sense two 
forms of auto-affection (auto-affection forte et auto-affection faible), but his 
distinction refers almost exclusively to the fact that auto-affection in the 
strong and absolute sense has the capacity to engender itself while auto-
affection in the weak sense is deprived of that capacity. Before stating that 
there are two lives,22 Henry writes that there is only one life.23 These 
apparently contradictory statements indicate that the phenomenology of life 
seems to lack a consistent argument to distinguish absolute from individual 
life, at least with regard to the problem of the origin of both “barbarism” and 
cultural rebirth. Moreover, both are tied to the specific human form of 
intentionality, and this implies that the ethical-religious ideal of “second 
birth” cannot be conceived of as a regression into pure affectivity. 
The second way out of the aporia would be to reconsider intentionality 
and thought as an integral part of man as a living being. Beyond the 
necessary critique of representation and objectification as possible vehicles 
for “barbarism,” such an endeavor would lead to a renewed appraisal of 
their benefits for an ethics of affectivity.  
Intentionality Reconsidered: Psychoanalysis, Action and 
“Second Birth” in Radical Phenomenology 
That intentionality has to be considered the necessary translation of 
affectivity and that without such a translation affectivity would simply not 
exist for us can be shown through an analysis of at least three themes that 
play a significant part in the phenomenology of life: the critique of 
psychoanalysis, the immanent reality of action and the immanent 
“dynamics” towards “second birth.” All of these themes are also relevant to 
ethical issues and to the importance of intentionality in them: they all 
demonstrate the existence of a living need for clarity and understanding that is 
to be fulfilled through the use of representations. 
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Henry’s critique of psychoanalysis, more specifically his critique of the 
psychoanalytical technique or therapy, is especially relevant here because it 
illustrates the struggle of the individual with his own existence on an 
affective level.  Indeed, in the Genealogy of Psychoanalysis as well as in 
Material Phenomenology, Henry has built up a convincing argument against a 
psychoanalytical method that would rely solely on the interpretation of 
chains of signifiers or on a purely hermeneutic approach to personal history. 
From the point of view of the phenomenology of life, such a method would 
attempt to get rid of affectivity instead of taking it into account.24 
But, while stressing that a genuinely affective relationship unfolds in 
psychoanalytical transfer, Henry seems to overlook the fact that this transfer 
alone cannot lead to any analytical progress without being verbalized, at 
least to some extent. Moreover, such a transfer would simply not exist had it 
not been prepared by a relationship developed through communication and 
representation. A purely immanent relationship might well exist at the core 
of all relationships, and that is why all community is intrinsically affective.  
It is one of the major achievements of the phenomenology of life to have 
pointed out the existence of the universal community of the living in, and 
through, absolute life. But to say that all relationships are affective in the 
sense of having an affective core is not the same as saying that intentionality 
should play no essential part in them. In other words, the example of the 
psychoanalytical praxis shows that distinctively human relationships are 
also necessarily intentional as well as mediated through language and 
representation. As for humans, we even have to recognize that there is a 
living, affective need for clarity, that is, for the translation of affectivity into 
representation. In the case of psychoanalysis such a need becomes 
particularly visible. In fact, the striving for clarity and understanding 
affectivity could be seen as defining the very task of psychoanalytical 
therapy. 
Broadly speaking, this goes a little further than Henry’s foundation-
thesis, since it does not only assert that all intentionality is grounded in 
affectivity, but also that intentionality is an indispensable part of human life 
or, in other words, that human life is always the life of intentionality. A 
closer look at Henry’s phenomenology of action suggests the same 
conclusion. 
Henry’s theory of action can be traced back to writings as early as 
Philosophy and Phenomenology of the Body (1965)25 and to his book on Marx 
(1976).26 In the latter, Henry states explicitly that the reality of action lies in 
the immanence of affectivity, not in what can be objectified and seen on the 
horizon of the world.27 This claim is both surprising and unsurprising: on 
the one hand, it is not surprising since it seems perfectly consistent with the 
main thesis of the onto-phenomenology of life, a thesis that situates 
fundamental reality in life’s affective self-revelation. On the other hand, it 
seems to stand in blatant contradiction of our everyday experience of action, 
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where the world in which we act and the intentional components of our 
actions are considered to be an essential part of what we do. However, to 
characterize these components simply as “irreal” (irréel) does not suffice to 
build a convincing argument. At least in Marx, Henry’s example of the 
runner leads perhaps to the most complete analysis that he gives of action as 
immanent praxis:  
Imaginons un coureur sur la cendrée du stade. En tant 
qu’objet de l’intuition, comme phénomène empirique, 
objectif, sensible, naturel, sa course est là pour tous et pour 
chacun. Mais les spectateurs regardent et ne font rien. Ce 
n’est donc pas l’intuition empirique de la course, son 
apparence objective qui peut la définir, constituer sa 
réalité, elle n’est justement que son apparence. La réalité 
de la course réside dans la subjectivité de celui qui court, 
dans l’expérience vécue qui n’est donnée qu’à lui et le 
constitue comme individu, comme cet individu en train de 
courir, comme un individu “déterminé“ pour parler 
comme Marx. C’est là ce que signifie l’affirmation décisive de 
la première thèse selon laquelle la pratique est subjective.”28 
If we imagine a runner on a track in a stadium, it is clear that we ascribe 
reality to this action only in as far as we see it, that is, through intuition. But 
it is also clear that we do so from the external point of view of a third person 
perspective. The subjective experience of this particular action of running is 
forever inaccessible to this perspective and what we see can only be the index 
of the subjective Erlebnis in the first person. And, since no index can 
overcome its essence as index, which is to point to what it is not, there will 
always remain an uncertainty with regard to the subjective reality of the 
action from the spectator’s point of view. Therefore, the first main 
characteristic of action is its opacity.29 But, it needs to be added that, since the 
subjectivity Henry refers to is the radical subjectivity of immanent life, the 
action is also opaque from a first person perspective.  
The runner can, in a way, see himself running, feel this or that part of his 
body, etc., but, in doing so, he introduces the distance that defines intuition 
and is already taking a point of view external to immanent auto-affection. 
Affectivity can therefore not be seen or intentionally grasped; it can only be 
lived through. Hence, on the one hand, it is perfectly consistent to stress that 
the real character of action is to be found in life and affectivity, whereas the 
absence of such affectivity implies an anonymous process like those found in 
nature, such as a waterfall or the movement of the leaves of a tree. On the 
other hand, however, it remains unclear on what grounds we could 
designate a purely immanent praxis as an action: does action not also and 
obviously imply intentional components, e.g. in the case of the runner (seeing 
the track unfolding in front of him, feeling his movements, evaluating the 
situation from a tactical point of view, etc.), and necessarily imply those 
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components? It is for this reason that the second characteristic ascribed by 
Henry to action, its blindness (aveugle), is intrinsically problematic as is his 
further claim that intuition itself does not constitute an action: “dans 
l’intuition nous n’agissons pas et […] dans l’action nous n’intuitionnons 
pas.”30 After all, intentionality is always - and is as such - activity and the 
ground for such activity must, again according to the foundation-thesis, lie 
in affectivity itself. From Henry’s standpoint there is therefore only one 
solution which can combine both the foundation of intuition in affectivity 
and the exclusion of object-relatedness as irreal. What is real (réel) in object-
relatedness is itself entirely alien to object-relatedness; it is the ground on 
which intuition becomes possible, that is immanent auto-affection.31 
However consistent this solution may be within the phenomenology of 
life, it does not entirely resolve the problem. We still have to ask what status 
should be ascribed to the irreal components of action, since an action that 
does not involve any of these components related to intentionality would 
simply not be an action anymore. But if seeing, observing, evaluating, etc. 
are at least to some extent necessary components for any action, they cannot 
be discarded as unessential in defining the reality of action itself. Thus, the 
only satisfactory solution lies in considering both affectivity and 
intentionality as defining together the reality of action. It might well be that 
we cannot exclude a purely immanent form of praxis, but, again, such a 
“praxis” would have no reality for us unless it is expressed in the form of 
intentionality. 
This is also confirmed if we look at one of the few passages where 
Henry analyzes the relationship between action and representation in the 
sphere of values: 
Si l’on définit l’éthique comme un rapport de l’action à des 
fins, à des normes ou à des valeurs, on a déjà quitté le site 
où elle se tient, soit la vie elle-même en laquelle il n’y a ni 
buts ni fins, et cela parce que la relation à celles-ci en tant 
que relation intentionnelle n’existe justement pas dans ce 
qui ignore en soi toute ek-stase. […] En vérité s’il y a des 
fins et des normes à prescrire à la vie […], il ne peut s’agir 
que de fins, de normes ou de valeurs provenant de la vie 
elle-même et à l’aide desquelles elle tente de se 
représenter ce qu’elle veut. Encore une telle représentation 
n’est-elle qu’occasionnelle, marquant une pause ou une 
hésitation dans l’action, laquelle se déroule dans 
l’immédiateté de sa spontanéité essentielle […] Loin par 
conséquent de déterminer l’action de la vie, fins, normes 
et valeurs sont au contraire déterminées par elles. Cette 
détermination consiste en ceci que, s’éprouvant soi-même 
constamment et se connaissant à tout instant, la vie sait 
aussi à tout instant ce qu’il faut faire et ce qui lui convient. 
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Un tel savoir n’est en aucune façon différent de l’action, il 
ne la précède ni ne la “détermine“ à proprement parler, lui 
étant identique, en tant que ce savoir-faire originel qu’est 
la vie, en tant que corps vivant. L’action […] n’est jamais 
que l’actualisation du pouvoir primitif de ce corps 
phénoménologique.32 
Indeed, if life knows at any time what is appropriate and convenient for 
it to do, then how are we to account for hesitation, which Henry mentions in 
the same passage? The only possible answer, it seems, is that we hesitate, 
because we, as living human beings, do not always possess the knowledge 
of life itself and that the recourse to representation is for us the means to 
clarify what life already knows. The knowledge of life (savoir de la vie) might 
well be immanent to us since we are living subjects, but it does not follow 
from this that we, as living subjects, do know what life knows. In the sphere 
of values and, in general, of the ethics of affectivity the recourse to 
representation is, at least to some extent, necessary. It fulfills the living need 
for clarity, a need that belongs to our human existence. It is therefore not 
certain that, as far as ethics and even action in general are concerned, such 
recourse remains as “exceptional” as Henry asserts. After all, we do more 
than occasionally ask ourselves what we should do as well as what we 
ought to do.33 
Now, looking back on what Henry writes about the recognition of 
absolute life in “second birth” we are confronted with the same difficulty. If 
“second birth” is necessarily dependent on the immanent “dynamics” of 
absolute life itself – a thesis implying the human’s “soteriological 
impotence”34 – it again appears that such recognition would have not 
existence for us unless it finds its intentional translation. In fact, Henry does 
stress that, through the forgetting of absolute life, it is “as if” the latter does 
not exist for those caught up in the “transcendental illusion of the ego”:  
En sa temporalité immanente la Vie absolue a beau joindre 
à soi celui qui, de venir après en elle, n’en est pas séparé 
pour autant – pas plus qu’il n’est séparé de lui-même […] 
– le fils prodigue ne l’en a pas moins oubliée. La 
puissance, plus intérieure à l’homme que lui-même, peut 
continuer d’œuvrer en lui sans qu’il le sache : n’est-elle 
pas cependant pour lui comme si elle n’était pas ? […] 
L’immanence de la Vie absolue dans la vie propre et 
singulière de l’ego, c’est ce qui rend théoriquement 
possible le salut de celle-ci. Mais, encore une fois, cette 
possibilité demeure théorique, n’est qu’une simple 
possibilité.35 
On the other hand, a purely immanent recognition or “second birth” 
would not be able to become an “emotional upheaval” (bouleversement 
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émotionnel) without any change in the sphere of representation. One can 
hardly imagine any emotional change without a change in the way we see 
ourselves and the world around us. It is perfectly conceivable that the 
experience of “second birth” might not be accompanied by a consciousness 
of its theoretical meaning in philosophy, theology and ethics. But it is 
inconceivable that a man who could leave the standpoint of the 
“transcendental illusion of the ego” or even, that of the refusal of life in 
“barbarism,” would not, at the same time, change the representations of 
himself and the world he is living in. Again, an absence of change in 
representations would amount to an absence of change tout court. 
What then are the conclusions that can be drawn with regard to the 
ethics of affectivity in radical phenomenology? Stating that, for us, life is 
always the life of intentionality seems to be a tautology insofar as “for us” 
necessarily implies the reference to consciousness. However, it also seems 
that this is precisely a point that is challenged by radical phenomenology 
through the duality of appearing thesis. Indeed, the originality and 
innovative power of Henry’s phenomenology is to conceive of a non- or 
infra-intentional appearing as immanent auto-affection or life. But what 
appears and to whom? According to Henry, it is life that appears to itself 
and through itself, thereby radically excluding any intentional mode of 
givenness (donation). From the ethical and religious perspective, however, 
the problem is that the “word of life” is unheard by humans. Hearing that 
word again would amount not only to the recognition of life as immanent 
affectivity, but also to the recognition of absolute life as the source of our 
own life. This recognition is central to Henryan ethics and philosophy of 
religion. In Paroles du Christ, the author clearly relies on a tour de force 
accomplished through the Scriptures, in which, according to Henry, absolute 
life reveals itself through the “word of the world” (parole du monde):  
L’extraordinaire accord qui s’établit entre la parole que le 
Christ adresse aux hommes dans le langage qui est le leur 
et celle qui génère chacun en son cœur et lui dit sa propre 
naissance provoque chez ceux qui la reconnaissent une 
emotion intense.36 
This can be seen as a further illustration of the idea that immanent life is 
“as if” it were non-existent for us, unless it receives the form of 
representation.37 Moreover, one has to come to this conclusion within the 
framework of radical phenomenology itself, as has been shown through 
Henry’s critique of psychoanalysis, his theory of action and, finally, through 
his concept of “second birth.” But it also suggests that the importance of 
intentionality and representation has been underestimated by radical 
phenomenology, especially with regard to the living need for clarity and 
representation inherent to human life. As a result, the tension between the 
duality- and the foundation-thesis seems to resolve itself through the 
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“absorption” of the former in the latter, since there is no intentional access to 
a purely immanent reality. 
More fundamentally, and with regard to the ethical and religious 
recognition of absolute life, the possible limits of affective-intentional 
translation of absolute and immanent life, for example in the domains of 
political and individual existence, need to be investigated and questioned. 
Concerning the existence of a political community, Henry has argued, 
for instance in his later articles “La Vie et la République” and “Difficile 
démocratie,”38 that democracy and human rights can only be founded in 
absolute life; therefore, only a society that recognizes this foundation is 
capable of a long-term recognition of equal rights, freedom, etc. But even 
admitting that modern societies rest or should rest on shared basic beliefs39 
does not solve the many specific questions and problems that do arise in the 
exercise of public policy. Again, public deliberation is necessarily mediated 
through language, and it is difficult to see how the social recognition of 
immanent life would translate itself univocally when concrete public 
decisions must be made.  
In addition to the need for a translation of affectivity into intentionality 
and language, we are now faced with a diversity of possible decisions that 
depend not only on affectivity but also on contingent historical and 
economic factors. This seems to argue in favor of a more complex model of 
human existence where intentionality, language – in one word: thought – 
possesses a relative autonomy while being nonetheless founded in affectivity. 
This is also suggested when we consider not political but individual 
existence. Here too, it is difficult to see how “second birth” or the 
recognition of absolute life as the foundation of our everyday existence 
would univocally translate itself into concrete decisions on this ground 
alone. Can the many questions arising out of the task of leading one’s 
personal existence really be answered solely by hearing the word of life in us 
(la parole de la vie en nous)?  
Or is it not possible that even if we hear that word again, even if we 
acknowledge with Fichte, whom Henry read, that the blessed life is the one 
in which we constantly feel our bond with God as the secret motive of all 
our thoughts, feelings and emotions – “als die verborgene Quelle und der 
geheime Bestimmungsgrund aller unserer Gedanken, Gefühle, Regungen und 
Bewegungen”40 – is it not true even then, that we have nonetheless to think 
our way through existence?  
It would mean that, while hearing the word of life, we may become 
truly receptive to the appeal of personhood as well as to the appeal of the 
social and political justice to be realized in any given situation. The 
recognition of life’s absoluteness is clearly at stake in ethics and politics. But 
it seems that individual and social existence cannot develop on the ground 
of this recognition alone. Michel Henry’s phenomenology of life therefore 
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has to be extended, not revoked. This extension remains the task to be 
undertaken. 
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